Counterproliferation capabilities are required by forces to meet worldwide needs, and CBRN defense is integral to counterproliferation capabilities. The Department s priorities for Counterproliferation capabilities are shown in Table 1. Table Combatant Commander Prioritized Counterproliferation Requirements Rank Counterproliferation Requirement 1 Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of Strategic, Operational and Tactical level actionable intelligence to support counterproliferation and counterterrorism.
The report also provides analyses on key supplier countries, including Russia, China, and North Korea.
The report also provides an analysis of CBRN terrorism, and an analysis of proliferation of WMD technologies resulting from emerging states and non-state actors. These analyses are summarized below. Many of the 33 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors worldwide have expressed interest in CBRN. Although terrorist groups probably will continue to favor long-proven conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings, the arrest of ricin plotters in London in January indicated that international mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct chemical and biological attacks.
It is not clear whether ricin attacks against Congressional offices, and perhaps other locations, were related. Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and government targets to CBRN attacks. One of our highest concerns is al-qa ida s stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as , Usama Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was a religious duty. Individuals from terrorist groups worldwide undertook poison training at al-qa ida sponsored camps in Afghanistan and have ready access to information on chemical, biological, radiological, and to some extent, even nuclear weapons, via the Internet, publicly available scientific literature, and scientific conferences, and we know that al-qa ida was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins.
A senior Bin Ladin associate on trial in Egypt in claimed his group had chemical and biological weapons. Documents and equipment recovered from al-qa ida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Ladin had a more sophisticated unconventional weapons research program than was previously known.
We also know that al-qa ida has ambitions to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and was receptive to any outside nuclear assistance that might become available. In February , during the trial on the al-qa ida bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, a government witness Jamal Ahmad Fadl testified that al-qa ida pursued the sale of a quantity of purported enriched uranium which in fact probably was scam material in Sudan in the early s. We assess that terrorist groups are capable of conducting attacks using crude radiological dispersal devices i.
Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable technologies continued to be more available around the world, new sources of supply emerged that made the challenge of stemming WMD and missile proliferation even more complex and difficult.
Nuclear fuelcycle and weapons-related technologies have spread to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be able to produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to weaponize it. As developing countries expanded their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also advanced toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional non-state actors became more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of concern developing longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional stability.
In this context, there was a growing concern that additional states that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related technology might have followed North Korea s practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other countries or by going one step further to supply such expertise to non-state actors.
Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers, there were growing numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD-and missile related materials and technology, who were able to act outside government constraints. Such non-state actors were increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied directly by countries with established capabilities. Ensure all capabilities are integrated and coordinated within the interagency community.
As the program management structure evolved, the CBRNDP was re-organized to provide a more streamlined and efficient oversight and management structure. The roles and responsibilities of all departmental organizations are detailed in the Implementation Plan for the Management of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, which was approved on April 22, The Department will review the plan in to make any necessary improvements or changes.
The new processes, roles, and responsibilities are described in Section 1. The only current radiological and nuclear defense capabilities include legacy systems limited to the detection of radiation.
Medical radiological defense research and hardening of equipment against nuclear effects fall outside the scope of the CBRN Defense Program. The CBRNDP management structure applies to the processes 1 to conduct planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of CBRN defense research, development and acquisition, 2 to establish military requirements for CBRN defense, 3 to test and evaluate CBRN defense programs, 4 to manage chemical and biological defense science and technology programs, 5 from program analysis and integration, and 6 for program oversight.
Under Sec. These index systems are referred to as Sentinel systems. In contrast to the previous organization, the new structure maintains two MDAs in a vertically integrated chain-of-command, rather than multiple MDAs that were horizontally coordinated. WIPTs are advisory bodies and will convene as required to address specific issues that need resolution. WIPTs will not convene as part of the normal coordination process.
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Unresolved issues will be elevated to the OIPT in a timely manner. These responsibilities include development of CBRN defense operational requirements, joint operational concepts, and architectures for passive defense, consequence management, force protection, and homeland security Military Departments Each of the Military Departments Army, Air Force, and Navy, including the Marines Corps plan and execute CBRN defense programs, from basic research through procurement and sustainment.
In fulfilling their responsibilities, the Military Departments ensure coordination and integration with other CBRN defense organizations.
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Where new materiel requirements are identified, submit requirement documents to the JRO and recommend for inclusion into the Modernization Plan. Provide representatives to all appropriate CBRN defense meetings and organizations. Conduct CBRN defense training, readiness, and sustainment.
Figure illustrates current Lead Service responsibilities to support Joint Programs. The military departments provide the essential infrastructure, which includes personnel with unique scientific, technical, and management expertise, and the laboratory and test facilities to meet the demands of developing and fielding CBRN defense equipment.
Annex J of this report provides a detailed description and assessment of the military s chemical and biological defense test and evaluation infrastructure, and the supporting laboratory infrastructure. These include capabilities for handling live chemical and biological agents and conducting a variety of tests. Selected key military facilities, for which more detail is provided in Annex J, include the following: U. Following are selected key responsibilities of Army as the Executive Agent. Thus there are two MDAs, though based on a single authority.
The JPEO-CBD provides centralized program management and Joint Service acquisition program integration for all assigned non-medical and medical chemical and biological defense programs.
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Develop and approve program and acquisition strategies. Provide the planning guidance, direction, control, and support necessary to ensure systems are developed in accordance with DoD acquisition guidance. Integrate interoperability with civilian emergency response agencies in the planning, guidance, direction, and control of newly acquired systems whenever possible.
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Oversee the development, coordination, and commitment to an acquisition program baseline and ensure immediate reporting of all imminent and actual breaches of approved baselines. In addition, ensure development of a recovery plan. Ensure interagency cooperation and timely transition of technologies to advanced development programs in order to reduce development cycle times Program Analysis and Integration Office PAIO.
The PAIO will review and analyze fiscal programs, requirements, resource planning, and resource allocation for the program years. This section provides an overview of some key cooperative efforts Other U. Government Organizations Several organizations within the U. An overview of these programs is provided below. DARPA is charged with seeking breakthrough concepts and technologies that will impact our national security.
The DARPA program is unique in that its focus is on the development of technologies with broad applicability against classes of threats. DARPA invests primarily in the early technology development phases of programs and the demonstration of prototype systems.
In accordance with 50 USC , the Director of DARPA shall seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities under the program with chemical and biological warfare defense activities of the military departments and defense agencies and shall coordinate the activities under the program with those of the military departments and defense agencies. The Congressional mandate also directs the CPRC to identify and eliminate redundancies and uncoordinated efforts, establish program and funding priorities, encourage and facilitate interagency funding, and ensure DOE programs are integrated with operational needs of other government agencies.
The TSWG also has an effective outreach program so that state and local agencies can benefit from new technology developments. TSWG membership includes representatives from nearly eighty organizations across the Federal Government. These representatives work together by participating in one or more of TSWG s nine subgroups. The CBRNC subgroup identifies and prioritizes interagency chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear combating terrorism requirements, and identifies solutions for detection, protection, decontamination, containment, mitigation, and disposal.
The strategy of the CBNP relies on close linkages between technology development and systems analysis and integration to systematically and comprehensively address the domestic chemical and biological terrorism threat. The CBNP is comprised of three key components: Definition of operational needs to guide the development and implementation of enhanced preparedness and response systems. Use of accelerated system demonstrations to enable rapid fielding of the best available systems and technologies to meet critical needs.
Development of individual technologies to enhance capabilities across the full spectrum of chemical and biological threats. Prior to the anthrax letter attacks of , the public sector has held relatively little interest in medical biological defense research, because identified biological warfare threats were of minor general medical interest and also because extensive and burdensome statutory safety measures are required in order to work with these agents. By the end of FY02, DoD medical biological defense research efforts included Small Business Innovative Research SBIR contracts and contract arrangements with 13 universities and 16 companies in the private sector, four of which are nonprofits.
Funded agreements also existed with eight other governmental agencies.
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Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID , the lead laboratory for medical biological defense research, have entered into an agreement to coordinate portions of their biodefense research and development programs including a shared animal facility, cooperative development of vaccines, drugs, alternate therapies and diagnostics, and development of standardized strain collections Other Interagency Coordination.
Following are some highlights of these coordination efforts: The InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability known as the IAB , is a partnership with federal, state, and local agencies focused on the capabilities necessary for fire, medical, and law enforcement responses to WMD terrorism.
Interagency Agreements with departments of Justice s Office Domestic Preparedness to purchase equipment in support of Justice s grant program.